Nationalist Cosmopolitanism: The Psychology of World Citizenship, National Identity, and Going to War for the Country

Abstract

Liberal nationalists claim that cosmopolitanism is incompatible with national identity and patriotism. While some scholars agree with this claim, others counter this charge by arguing that cosmopolitanism is consonant with nationalism. Yet few efforts have been made to analyze the relationship between cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and patriotic obligations at the individual level. Drawing from social psychology, I argue that cosmopolitans are both world citizens and nationalists. They have a dual identity. When the welfare of the nation is at stake, they activate their national identity to fulfill their patriotic obligations. Using data from the latest wave of the World Values Survey (2010-2014), I show that individuals who identify as world citizens also identify with the nation and are willing to perform the ultimate patriotic sacrifice of going to war for their country. This result indicates that cosmopolitan and national identities are compatible, and world citizenship does not rule out patriotic concern.

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Introduction

Cosmopolitanism reflects a distinct moral stance that takes individual human beings as “the ultimate units of moral concern”, irrespective of their nationality, citizenship or other communal affiliations (Pogge, 1992, p. 48; Nussbaum, 1996; Lu, 2000; Brown and Held, 2010). Some liberal nationalists -and communitarians more broadly- claim that cosmopolitanism’s moral universalism incompatible with nationalism and patriotic obligations (e.g. Walzer 1996). While some agree with this claim, others argue that cosmopolitanism is compatible with nationalism and obligations to the nation (e.g. Barry 1995; Nielson, 1999; Tan, 2004). The relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism has long been a central debate in political science, interesting scholars of political philosophy, international relations, and comparative politics. Michael Zuern (2014, p. 1) argues that the “cosmopolitanism vs. communitarianism [sic.] debate may possibly restructure politics in the 21st century. Yet few efforts have been made to focus on the “cosmopolitan condition of real people” (Beck and Szeniaider, 2006, p. 9) and analyze how cosmopolitan individuals make sense of their national identity and patriotic duties.

In this article, I examine the relationship between cosmopolitan and national identities as alternative constructions of the self at the individual level. I seek to push the envelope and start a dialogue between two scholarly literatures that rarely speak to each other: theories of liberal nationalism/cosmopolitanism and psychological theories of identity formation. I import fresh insights from psychology and argue that cosmopolitans tend to have a compartmentalized dual identity that embodies both nationalism and global citizenship. In cases of perceived threats to national welfare, national identity dominates cosmopolitans’ political reasoning, leading them to
act in patriotic ways.

An important dimension of the long-standing cosmopolitanism-nationalism in political science debate centers on social identity. Both sides make claims about individuals’ social identities and the implications of these identities for social cohesion provision. Liberal nationalists emphasize national identity and its ability to facilitate social cohesion within the boundaries of the nation. Cosmopolitans accent world citizenship identity and its ability to promote global solidarity. Liberal nationalists worry that in a cosmopolitan world people will be estranged from their national identity, which is essential for the realization of liberal principles and for the welfare of the nation. In contrast, cosmopolitans see nationalism as an impediment to world citizenship that will motivate people to advance the wellbeing of all human beings and strive for global justice.

What is sometimes forgotten in the cosmopolitanism-nationalism debate is the multifaceted nature of individuals’ social identities. Exceptions aide (e.g. Appiah, 1997; Nielson, 1999; Tan 2004), important macro theories still consider cosmopolitan and national identities as mutually exclusive. One is either a nationalist or a world citizen. One cares either about the welfare of the nation or humanity. This dichotomous characterization of cosmopolitan and national identities, however, paints an unrealistic picture of the psychology of social identity. Individuals often have multiple social identities (e.g. a Buddhist, woman, lawyer) and use cognitive tools to manage the different understandings of themselves. By treating cosmopolitan and national identities in isolation, some macro theories ignore the possibility that one can be a nationalist cosmopolitan and resourcefully negotiate between the conflicting role obligations these identities imply. And scholars who argued that national and cosmopolitan identities can be compatible have yet to uncover the psychological underpinnings of this compatibility.
Neither liberal nationalists nor cosmopolitans to date have appealed to the rich and tremendously influential psychological research tradition on social identity. To shed new light on the cosmopolitanism-nationalism debate, I import insights from psychological approaches to social identity that focus on multiple social identities.

I argue that cosmopolitans have a dual identity. They are both world citizens and nationalists. Cosmopolitans who adopt a sense of world citizenship hold onto their national identity because this identity has high psychological centrality and the nation is an optimal social category that is inclusive enough to satisfy individuals’ need to belong and at the same time exclusive enough serve as a basis for shared distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991; 2003). This dual identity is compatible with the behavioral expectations associated with national identity, namely patriotism. Cosmopolitans compartmentalize their world citizen and national identities by psychologically representing them as non-overlapping understandings of themselves that are context-sensitive (Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Bodenhausen, 2010). When a situation renders the wellbeing of the nation salient, cosmopolitans activate their national identity and fulfill their patriotic obligations. By offering a psychological account of nationalist cosmopolitanism, this study explains the cognitive underpinnings of this dual identity and provides the psychological micro-foundations to theories that see cosmopolitanism and nationalism compatible with each other such as those postulated by Nielson, Tan, and Appiah outlined below.

Using data from the 2010-2014 (latest) wave of the Word Values Survey, I show that those who identify as cosmopolitan world citizens also identify with the nation and are willing to perform the ultimate patriotic sacrifice of going to war for their country. This result indicates that cosmopolitan and national identities are in harmony, and world citizenship does not rule out patriotic concern. Contemporary cosmopolitans are attached to the nation-state in ways Zeno, the
Greek Cynics, or Kant did not imagine.

My findings suggest that any conflict between cosmopolitanism and nationalism is creatively managed at the individual level in favor of a dual cosmopolitan identity. In the minds of cosmopolitan individuals, one can be a nationalist cosmopolitan. This result helps illuminate the rise of nationalist movements around the world, particularly in Western democracies in the last few years. The growing integration of markets, communities, and cultures since the end of the Cold War has been breeding a new generation of people who consider themselves to be world citizens. The number of people who identify as cosmopolitan world citizens has risen considerably in the last two decades. Cosmopolitanism, many thought and hoped, would inspire a new era of post-national politics by bringing people together to solve global problems such as climate change and poverty and, thereby, reinforce global humanitarianism. However, the opposite seems to be the case. Brexit, Donald Trump’s election win, and the rise of right-wing parties such as the Front Nationale in France, the Freedom Party in Austria, and the Alternative for Germany across continental Europe seems to indicate that nationalism trumps cosmopolitanism. Some liberals are puzzled by the resurgence of nationalism in the Western World. Where are all the individuals who identified themselves in national and international surveys as world citizens? This study shows that words citizenship does not equal rejection of national identity and pride. Despite beliefs to the contrary, world citizens do not shed their national identity in favor of a global and cosmopolitan identity.

The results of this study have important implications for existing debates in political science that still tend to juxtapose nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The evidence in support of nationalist cosmopolitanism indicates that psychological approaches that explain how individuals manage divergent social identities and clashing identity obligations can contribute to macro
theories of cosmopolitanism and nationalism in political science and open new avenues of research. This study also shows that the cosmopolitanism of real people does not rule out patriotic obligations. When specific situations make their national identity salient, world citizens put their nationalist hat on to fulfill their patriotic obligations. This finding indicates that commitment to moral universalism is compatible with patriotism at the micro-level and so should mitigate liberal nationalists’ concerns about the perils of cosmopolitanism.

Finally, this study suggests an agenda for research that reconnects cosmopolitanism and nationalism in the study of international conflict and cooperation. Research on foreign policy dispositions has demonstrated that cooperative internationalism shaped by cosmopolitanism generates a sense of obligation toward the wider international community, leading to support for international cooperation and organizations (Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis, 1995; Rathbun, 2007; Nincic and Ramos, 2010; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). On the other hand, many have argued that strong national identities associate with hawkish foreign policy preferences and result in international conflict (Mercer 1995; Sambanis and Shayo, 2013; Mearsheimer, 2014). By showing that cosmopolitans are also nationalists and willing to fight for the nation, this research encourages scholars of political philosophy, international relations, and comparative politics to reconsider the relationship between cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and global cooperation.

In the next section, I introduce the cosmopolitanism-nationalism debate and argue that pitting cosmopolitanism and nationalism against each other neglects the plurality of individuals’ social identities. Drawing from psychological approaches to social identity, I then hypothesize that cosmopolitans are both world citizens and nationalists, and this dual identity is compatible with patriotic obligations. Part three presents the data and variables and part four presents the results. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the cosmopolitanism-nationalism
debate and for global governance.

**Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotic Obligations**

The term ‘cosmopolitan’ originates from the Greek word *kosmopolitês* and means citizen of the world (Miller, 2010). While there are many definitions of cosmopolitanism (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002; Brown and Held, 2010; Kleingeld and Brown 2013), at the most basic level, cosmopolitanism reflects a universalist ethical perspective (Pogge, 1992; Lu, 2000). “[It] maintains that there are moral obligations owed to all human beings based solely on their humanity alone, without reference to race, gender, nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion, political affiliation, state citizenship or other particularities (Brown and Held, 2010, p. 1).” The idea of world citizenship lies at the heart of this universalist ethical stance. Cosmopolitans are world citizens who see humanity as their moral community, and subscribe to the idea of moral obligations owed to all human beings (Nussbaum 1996; Heater, 2002; Beardsworth, 2010; Kleingeld, 2011; Bayram, 2015).

Similarly, while definitions of nationalism abound (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Smith, 1991; Brubaker 1999; Ohad and Bar-Tal, 2009), common to most conceptualizations are three main elements (Dekker, Malova, and Hoogendoorn, 2003; Miscevic, 2014). First, nationalism includes a political ideology that conceives of the nation as the legitimate unit of political organization held together by common values, traits, or history, that has the right to be independent and deserves loyalty. Second, nationalism embodies obligations of membership that serve the wellbeing of the nation and sustain its independence. While patriotism might be differentiated from nationalism as love for the nation (Conover, and Feldman. 1987; Kosterman
Can cosmopolitanism accommodate national identity and patriotic duties? This question has long been at the center of lively political and normative debates in political science (Rorty, 1994; Nussbaum, 1996; Lu, 2000; Archibugi, 2003; Bowden, 2003; Audi, 2009; Zuern, 2014). A frequently expressed criticism of cosmopolitanism is that its moral universalism is incommensurate with national identity and patriotic duties. Because it extends the scope of one’s moral obligations to humanity and conceives of national or other communal ties are morally peripheral, liberal nationalists charge cosmopolitanism with the inability to acknowledge the importance of national identity and patriotic obligations.\(^1\) The incompatibility thesis finds it most potent expression in Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, p. 6), who noted that cosmopolitanism is flawed because its universal morality rules out patriotic concerns, ranging from simply advancing the interests of one’s own nation to going “to war on one’s community’s behalf, if necessary.”

Liberal nationalists’ critique of cosmopolitanism has both empirical and theoretical grounding. First, they are concerned that cosmopolitanism ignores the centrality of national identity to most peoples’ lives. David Miller (2000), for example, argues that cosmopolitanism neglects the fact that most people feel attached to their nation. Similarly, Michael Walzer (2008, 1995) criticizes cosmopolitanism’s universalist moral code for being abstract and disconnected

\(^1\) See Tan (2004) for a review of the anti-cosmopolitan and cosmopolitan positions.
from reality. He contends that individuals’ moral compass is intimately related to the “local”, particularly the nation as the most prevalent form of political organization.

Second, liberal nationalists lament that cosmopolitanism does not adequately consider the importance of national communities and patriotic duties (MacIntyre, 1984; R. Miller 1988; 1995; Tamir 1995; Kymlicka, 1995; 2001; Walzer 1995; 2008). For liberal nationalists, liberal values, including justice, freedom, and equality, and solidarity are best realized within a national community, which is predicated upon feelings of national attachment and patriotic obligations (Miller, 1995; Tamir 1995; Kymlicka, 1995; 2001).\(^2\) Liberal nationalists are concerned that cosmopolitanism detracts from the moral and political importance of national identities and communities.

By contrast, cosmopolitans are troubled by nationalism and patriotic partiality. They see nationalism an obstacle to wellbeing of all human beings and global justice. Those cosmopolitans who subscribe to the incompatibility argument unapologetically oppose nationalism and see it as antithetical to cosmopolitan moral universalism (Nussbaum, 1996; Lichtenberg, 1999, Barry 1999; Moellendorf, 2002; Brock 2002). Others recognize some of the criticisms raised by liberal nationalists. For example, Charles Beitz (1999, p. 291) notes that the “philosophical weakness most characteristic of cosmopolitan theories .... is a failure to take seriously enough the associative relationships that individuals do and almost certainly must develop to live successful and rewarding lives.”

Some defenders of cosmopolitanism make the case that cosmopolitanism and nationalism

\(^2\) See Brock (2002) for a review of the essential purposes of the national communities ranging from promoting democracy to fulfilling basic human needs such as security and personal agency.
are not rivals. Kai Nielson (1999, also see Couture and Nielson, 1998), for example, argues that cosmopolitanism clashes with ethnic nationalism but is compatible with liberal nationalism because liberal nationalism respects the universal egalitarian morality of cosmopolitanism. In the same way, Kwame Anthony Appiah (1997), defends a liberal cosmopolitan position that celebrates national and other identities but prioritizes the rights and dignity of all persons. National identities and patriotism, Appiah notes, do not detract from loyalty to the humankind. Building upon Brian Barry (1995), Kok-Chor Tan (2004) similarly argues that cosmopolitanism is compatible with nationalism and patriotic obligations. Some contributors to the cosmopolitanism-nationalism debate from sociology similarly stress the compatibility between cosmopolitanism and nationalism (Beck, 2006; Cheah 2006; Calhoun, 2007), while others remain more skeptical (Hannerz, 1990; Beck, 2002)

The empirical evidence on the relationship between world citizen and national identities is thin, and results are mixed. Some studies show that global interconnectedness has promoted cosmopolitanism and weakened national identities (e.g. Norris, 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2009; Pichler, 2011). Other studies demonstrate that globalization has fostered supranational attachments which changed but not weakened national identities. (e.g. Jung 2008). Others found a positive association between national identity and cosmopolitan commitment to cultural diversity (Brett and Moran, 2011). More recently, some scholars have shown that not all forms of nationalism are associated with political cohesion (Breidahl et al., 2017) and that different dimensions of nationalism may relate to social justice in different ways (Miller and Sundas, 2012). On balance, we lack a systematic analysis of the relationship between cosmopolitanism, national identity, and patriotism at the individual level that can help resolve the cosmopolitanism-nationalism debate.

Although a variegated one, a crucial dimension of the debate between cosmopolitans and
liberal nationalists hinges on individual social identity. Since they see national communities essential for the realization of social justice, freedom, and group cooperation, liberal nationalists are concerned that the cosmopolitan vision of world citizenship distances people from their national identity and interest in the welfare of the nation. Cosmopolitans, in contrast, see national identity as a barrier to the development of a sense of world citizenship, which is necessary to motivate individuals to care about global justice and the wellbeing of all human beings.

I argue that pitting cosmopolitanism and nationalism against each other treats cosmopolitan and national identities as mutually exclusive. Scholars who make the incompatibility argument neglect an obvious dimension of the human condition—humans have multiple social identities and they are capable of negotiating between the potentially clashing role obligations that might be associated with these identities. While it might be the case that some individuals have an exclusively national or world citizen identity, this need not be the case for everyone. One can identify both the nation and humanity. One can be interested in the welfare of one’s national community as well as the global community. To make the case for the moral and political significance of nationalism or cosmopolitanism, those who subscribe to the incompatibility argument, have overlooked that many people have complex social identities that consist of multiple group attachments and divergent identity obligations. Juxtaposing cosmopolitanism and nationalism paints an unrealistic picture of the psychology of social identity and obscures how actual people might make sense of national and world citizenship identities.

By importing insights from psychological approaches to social identity, specifically from theories of multiple social identity management, we can gain an understanding of how cosmopolitans negotiate between their world citizen and national identities and tackle the trade-off between moral universalism and patriotism. I recognize the plurality of political identities
beyond nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Regional identities such as European identity (Risse 2003, Zapryanova and Surzhko-Harned, 2016; Bayram, 2017a;) or Pan-Arabism do play a role in shaping individuals’ lives and political attitudes. I am also cognizant that national identity has different dimensions, and the argument that nationalism facilitates social cohesion has subtleties I am unable to do justice here (Miller and Sundas, 2014). However, to push boundaries and contribute to a major debate by building a bridge between political science and psychology, I temporarily bracket these matters. In the following sections, I draw on research on social psychology to make the case that cosmopolitans are world citizens and nationalists, and this dual identity is identity is compatible with patriotic obligations.

The Psychology of Nationalist Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitan Patriotism

Cosmopolitan identity is an acquired social identity that has a psychological foundation shaped by individuals’ value priorities. As Bayram (2015) has shown, individuals who place emphasis on self-transcendence, openness-to-change, and achievement values identify as cosmopolitan world citizens. I contend that when cosmopolitans endorse world citizen identity, they continue to identify with their nation and develop a dual identity. Two complementary motives underpin this dual identity. First is psychological centrality. Psychological centrality refers to the importance individuals attitude to their membership in a social group. It can take two forms. Explicit centrality captures the value one places on an identity consciously. Implicit centrality refers the importance placed on an identity subconsciously (Stryker and Serpe 1994; Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004).

One crucial aspect of psychologically central social identities is that they chronically important to individuals’ understanding of themselves. The degree of their centrality can vary
across different situations. However, because they lie at the core of who one is, psychologically central identities are chronically salient. This implies that when individuals adopt a new social category as self-defining, they are unlikely to relinquish their psychologically central identities. For example, a person who has a strong sense of Croatian identity is unlikely to give it up and identify as European after the accession of Croatia to the European Union in 2013.

National identity has high psychological centrality. Most people are born into a system of political organization that is based on the nation-state and nationality. They encounter national identity as a social fact, a “natural” social identity. Self-categorization as a member of the nation often “constitutes the first recognition of a macro-social group by the child” (David and Bar-Tal, 2009, p. 360). National identity is also an integral part of people’s political socialization. Not only is citizenship often based on national identity but agents of political socialization, such as governments, mass education systems, and the media, routinely use national identity to cultivate a common ingroup identity and to define the role citizens ought to play in the national society (Billig, 1995; Paasi, 1999; Anderson, 2006). As a result, individuals learn to value their national identity and make it a central component of who they are (Miller 2000; Spiner-Halev and Theiss-Morse, 2003; David and Bar-Tal D, 2009).

Cosmopolitans are no exception. They learn to think and act in terms of national identity. Through repeated exposure to nationalized social practices and discourses, they come to attribute psychological importance to national identity and view it as important to their self-concept that serves a series of motivational needs. Because national identity has psychologically centrality, cosmopolitans retain their national identity when they endorse world citizenship as a new social identity.
The second psychological factor that explains cosmopolitans’ dual identification is optimal distinctiveness. Optimal distinctiveness theory, a major psychological theory of social identity, posits that two opposing human needs govern the ways in which individuals acquire group identities: the need for inclusion or to belong and the need for differentiation or to be distinct (Brewer, 1991; 2001). On the one hand, individuals are motivated to identify with social groups and acquire a sense of belonging. On the other hand, they seek distinctiveness from others and covet differentiation between in and outgroups.3

These two conflicting needs operate simultaneously, and keep each other in check, leading individuals to seek “optimal” or balanced social identities. As Brewer (2009, p. 157) explains, [o]ptimal identities are those that satisfy the need for inclusion within the ingroup and simultaneously serve the need for differentiation through distinctions between the ingroup and outgroups. In effect, optimal social identities involve shared distinctiveness.”

The simultaneous operation of the need to belong and to be distinct means that a social identity must satisfy both of these needs at the same time. When the need for inclusion is satisfied, the need for exclusion is activated, and vice versa. Therefore, individuals endorse social identities that are “inclusive enough” to fulfill the need to belong to a social group and generate a sense of ingroup, and at the same time, “exclusive enough” such that they provide a basis for differentiation between the ingroup and outgroups (Brewer, 1991; 2009).

The fundamental drive for optimal distinctiveness is an important factor that explains why those who identify as world citizens also identify with the nation. The hallmark of world

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3 Strong evidence shows that the need for inclusion and differentiation are central to how humans relate to their social environment and develop social identities (e.g. Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Tajfel 1981).
citizenship is identification with humanity as a whole, yet world citizenship is a psychologically suboptimal identity compared to national identity. Humanity is an overly inclusive and amorphous social category. Not only is it too large offer a meaningful sense of belonging but it lacks clear defining characteristics to provide shared distinctiveness and ingroup/outgroup differentiation. Some liberal nationalists have long recognized that world citizenship is psychologically a suboptimal identity (Kymlicka 1989; Tamir 1995; Miller, 1995)

Since humanity as a social category is not “exclusive enough” to offer a sense of ingroup identity and a basis for differentiation between the ingroup and outgroups, the need for optimal distinctiveness leads cosmopolitans to maintain keep their national identity as a basis for shared distinctness. When they choose to identify as world citizens, cosmopolitans continue to desire membership in membership in the nation to satisfy the need to belong and have positive ingroup distinctiveness.

Researchers generally view national identity as an optimal social identity that concurrently balances the needs for inclusion and exclusion (Greenfeld, 1992; Billig, 1995; Miller 1995; Bar-Tal and Staub 1997; Spiner-Halev and Theiss-Morse, 2003, Brewer, 2009). Because it enshrines and reproduces specific group characteristics in symbols, traditions, values, and memories or what Samuel Huntington (2004, p. 8) calls identity “substance,” national identity simultaneously answers two questions: “who is us” and “what are we” (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004, p. 6). National identity tells people which characteristics define them and by extension separate others from them and what kind of people belong to their ingroup and what kind of people are excluded. Of course, national identity is not the only optimal identity that is available to an individual. In the context of the Christian faith, for example, being a Presbyterian is simultaneously inclusive and distinctive, and thus an optimal identity. But in the context of inter-faith dialogue, Presbyterian
identity is likely to be isolating while Christian identity will be optimal (Leonardelli, Pickett, and Brewer, 2010).

In the context of international relations, national identity is sufficiently inclusive and differentiating whereas world citizenship is less so. World citizen identity does not clearly define “who is us” and “what are we” and as a result remains a psychologically sub-optimal identity. Therefore, cosmopolitans who identify as world citizens hold onto their national identity as a source of optimal distinctiveness. As they immerse themselves in the category of humankind, the need for inclusion is satisfied. But due to the overly inclusive and nebulous nature of humanity as a category of social identification, the need for differentiation through a distinction between “us” vs. “them” is aroused. To simultaneously satisfy the needs for inclusion and positive distinctiveness, cosmopolitans who define themselves as world citizens maintain their national identity, resulting in a dual identity.

These arguments about psychological centrality and optimal distinctiveness lead to the 

*nationalist cosmopolitanism hypothesis* (H1).

*Nationalist cosmopolitanism hypothesis*: Cosmopolitans identify with their nation.

Is this dual identity able to accommodate patriotic duties? Put differently, are cosmopolitans patriots? I argue they are. Cosmopolitans compartmentalize their world citizen and national identities and activate the latter when wellbeing of the nation is involved at stake. As decades of research has shown, social identity is not merely an understanding of the self but an indispensable part of how human beings behave. Social identities provide norms for thought and action. When individuals see themselves as a member of a social group, they adopt the norms,
characteristics, and interests of the group as their own, and therefore think and act in terms of that group identity (Tajfel 1981; Brewer and Gardner 1996; Bayram, 2017b).

Because social identities carry behavioral norms, individuals with multiple social identities might face identity conflict when the normative expectations for one identity are incompatible with the other. Research on how individuals negotiate between their multiple social identities has grown exponentially in the last two decades (Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Crisp and Hewstone, 2007; Bodenhausen, 2010; Kang and Bodenhausen, 2015; Hirsh and Kang, 2016). Scholars have examined the effects of multiple social identities on perceiving other individuals (Stangor, Lynch, Duan, and Glass, 1992), ingroup bias and outgroup prejudice (Urban and Miller, 1998; Brewer, and Pierce, 2005;), ingroup projection (Wenzel, Mummendey, and Waldzus, 2007), and on biculturalism and inter-racial relations (Cheng and Lee, 2009).

A key insight of this research tradition is that individuals have cognitive tools at their disposal to manage the potentially conflicting behavioral requirements of their social identities (Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Bodenhausen, 2010). For instance, they might merge two social identities into a new inclusive identity. An example of this strategy is bicultural identity integration, such as Asian American or French Canadian. Another strategy of managing divergent social identities is compartmentalization. Individuals can keep two social identities separate and switch from one to the other in different situations but do not activate both identities at the same time. For example, women in male-dominated professions might compartmentalize their gender and professional identities and only activate the latter (e.g. engineer or firefighter) in the work place.
I argue cosmopolitans compartmentalize their world citizen and national identities, activate their national identity when the wellbeing of the nation is at stake. To reconcile the cosmopolitan principle of moral universalism with patriotism, cosmopolitans psychologically represent world citizen and national identities as independent non-overlapping understandings of themselves. They identify as world citizens or nationalists in different situations, but not activate both identities at the same time. As Roccas and Brewer (2002, pp. 90-91), explain, “[w]ith compartmentalization, social identities are context specific or situation specific. In certain contexts, one group membership becomes the primary basis of social identity, whereas other group identities become primary in different contexts.” Context sensitivity of compartmentalized social identities implies that different group norms and identity obligations guide individual behavior depending on the context. Individuals behave in terms of the norms and standards of whichever social identity is primary in a certain situation.\(^4\) This is called identity switching.

The advantage of compartmentalization is that it affords people the opportunity to maintain two possibly non-convergent identities and manage clashing the identity obligations by identity switching. The individual develops a dual identity and uses identity switching to take on one or the other identity depending on which one is rendered salient in a given situation.

Cosmopolitans choose to compartmentalize their world citizen and national identities because this psychological strategy enables them to be both global citizens and patriots. When circumstances make the wellbeing of the nation salient, cosmopolitans switch from world citizenship to national identity and activate the beliefs and norms that define being a good member of the nation, leading them to fulfil their national role obligations or patriotic duties.

\(^4\) This social psychological insight is consistent with sociological accounts of identity and role performance (Stryker, 1968; Stryker and Serpe, 1982).
Patriotism can manifest itself in a wide range of actions, ranging from saluting the flag to obeying the laws and institutions of the country. Here I focus on the ultimate patriotic sacrifice—going to war for the nation. Willingness to go to war for the country means that one is ready to kill and be killed in the for the sake of the nation. This puts cosmopolitan’s patriotism to a hard test. Therefore, \textit{cosmopolitan patriotism hypothesis} (H2) predicts that:

\textit{Cosmopolitan patriotism hypothesis}: Cosmopolitans are willing to go to war for their country.

\textbf{Data and Variables}

To test my argument, I use data from the latest version of the World Values Survey (WVS) fielded in 60 countries between 2010 and 2014.\footnote{\textsc{WORLD VALUES SURVEY} Wave 6 2010-2014 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20150418. World Values Survey Association (\url{www.worldvaluessurvey.org}). The data is publicly available for replication.} The unit of analysis is the individual survey respondent. To capture cosmopolitan identity, participants are asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the statement “I see myself as a world citizen.” Similarly, national identity is measured by asking respondents to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the statement “I see myself as a part of the […] nation. Responses to both questions are coded on a four-point scale ranging from “Strongly agree (coded 4)” to “Strongly disagree (coded 1).”

To capture patriotic duties, I focus on one’s willingness to fight for the country as the ultimate sacrifice for the nation. Respondents are presented the following question: “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” Response options are coded on a binary scale made up of “Yes (coded 1)” and “No (coded 2).”
One might argue that willingness to fight for the country is not the same as actually going to war. While the item measuring the dependent variable captures respondents’ intentions not behavior, empirical evidence indicates that intentions are predictive of behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). Furthermore, evidence accumulated across various disciplines indicates that expressed preferences measured in survey self-reports are valid predictors of actual behavior. In a meta-analysis of over 500 studies, Chang, Krosnick, and Albertson (2011), for example, found that self-reports derived from surveys largely match the objective indicators of behavior (38% perfect match, 73% very close match). As John Krosnick (2012, p. 35) notes, there are reasons to be optimistic “about the continued accuracy of surveys as a method of collecting data.”

An important analytical reason also justifies why asking respondents’ about their willingness to go to war is a sensible measure. In a large number of countries included in the WVS, there is no compulsory military service. Therefore, measuring citizens’ intentions to fight for their country is therefore the only available measure. Among those countries that have some form of conscription, rules and regulations vary greatly. To examine patriotic sacrifice cross-nationally, focusing expressed preferences is the most viable.

Existing research has identified a series of individual level factors that associate with individuals’ willingness to fight for their nation. Scholars widely consider national pride to be an important predictor of willingness to go to war for the country (Klingemann, 1999; Torgler 2003; Puranen 2015). National pride is tapped by asking participants how proud they are to be [nationality], with response choices spanning from “Very proud (coded 4)” to “Not at all proud

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6 Also see Stern (1995).
“Existing studies have also found that individuals who have confidence in the military are more willing to fight for their country (Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel, 2015). The variable *Confidence in military* measures how much confidence respondents have in their country’s armed forces. Response options range from “A great deal” (coded 4) to “None at all (coded 1).”

The implication of democratic peace theory at the micro-level is that individuals who have a strong preference for democracy should be less supportive of war especially when other democracies are involved. Previous works have found some evidence in support of this expectation (Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel, 2005; Puranen 2015; Jakobsen, Jakobsen, and Ekevold, 2016). The variable *Support for Democracy* captures participants’ views on whether a democratic political system is a good way to govern their country, with choice options anchored by “Very good (coded 4)” and “Very bad (coded 1).”

There is evidence that emancipative values that emphasize individuals’ self-actualization associate with lower levels of willingness to fight for one’s country (Welzel, 2013; Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel, 2015). As people embrace emancipative values such as independence, respect for choice –especially sexual choice and reproductive freedom-, gender equality, and voice for people from all walks of life, they grow weary of the human cost of war, and thus become unwilling to fight in a war. I focus on the pro-choice dimension of the index of emancipative values. Respondents are asked to indicate whether abortion, divorce, and homosexuality are justifiable on a ten-point scale from “always justifiable (coded 10)” to “never justifiable (coded 1).” The *Emancipative Values* scale is the standardized average of answers to these three questions.

Finally, I take into account the demographic characteristics of participants, including gender (*Female*), age in years (*Age*), level of education (*Education*), and household income.
(Income). 7

Analysis and Results

I present the results in two stages. I first focus on the relationship between cosmopolitan and national identities and demonstrate that cosmopolitan world citizens also identify with their nation. I then turn to cosmopolitans’ patriotism and show that world citizens are as willing to fight for their nation.

As can be seen in Figure 1, among the 84,632 respondents spread across 60 countries, about 32 percent, 27,185, strongly agreed and about 43 percent agreed with the statement “I see myself as a citizen of the world.” About 24 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Table 1 presents the percentage of world citizens across countries. In Qatar, Nigeria, Ecuador, Ghana, Rwanda, the Philippines, India, and Uzbekistan, a very large number of respondents strongly agree with statement “I see myself as a citizen of the world” (percentages range from 71 to 50). We observe the weakest level of strong cosmopolitan identification in the Netherlands, Japan, Slovenia, Hong Kong, and in Palestine (percentages range from 10 to 14).

If we combine “strongly agree” and “agree” answers, we observe that world citizenship is strongest in Malaysia, Ghana, the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, Ecuador, Mexico, Nigeria, Qatar, Columbia, Rwanda, Spain, Pakistan, Turkey, South Africa, India, Peru, Armenia, Brazil, Poland, Kyrgyzstan, Taiwan, and Uruguay (percentages range from 96 to 80). Similarly, if we pool

7 Female is a binary variable (female coded 1, male coded 0). The age variable captures respondents’ age in years. The income variable measures the level of household income as indicated by respondents and ranges from 1 lowest income group to 10 highest income group. The variable education captures the years of education respondents have completed and ranges from 12 years or less (coded 1) to 21 years or more (coded 10).
“strongly disagree” and “disagree” answers, we observe that world citizenship is weakest in Egypt, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Palestine, Lebanon, Libya, and Iraq (percentages range from 40 to 63).

[Figure 1. About Here]

The *Nationalist cosmopolitanism hypothesis* predicts that cosmopolitans identify with their nation. Results support this expectation. As Figure 2 shows, individuals who define themselves as cosmopolitan world citizens also express a strong sense of attachment to the nation. For example, among those who express the highest commitment to being a world citizen, over 82 percent strongly identify with the nation. Among those articulate a moderate commitment world citizenship, about 39 percent strongly and 56 percent somewhat identify with the nation.

[Figure 2. About Here]

If we look at the average strength of national identification among those who identify as world citizens and those who do not (Table 2), we see little substantive difference. Those who strongly identify and those who do not identify as a world citizen express comparable degrees of national identification.\(^8\) The average strength of national identification is in fact higher among strong cosmopolitan identifiers. For example, among those who answered “Strongly Agree” to the world citizenship question, the mean level of national identification is about 15 percent higher relative to those who answered “Strongly Disagree”, and 18 percent higher compared to those who answered “Disagree.” These findings show that cosmopolitans are also nationalists, lending

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\(^8\) Pairwise mean difference tests using a Bonferroni correction show statistically significant differences in national identification across categories of cosmopolitan identification, yet substantively, these differences are relatively small, all less than 0.5.
credence to the *nationalist cosmopolitanism* hypothesis.\(^9\)

[Table 2. About Here]

The *Cosmopolitan patriotism hypothesis* predicts that cosmopolitans are willing to go to war for their nation. To test this prediction, I estimate three logistic regression models that investigate the relationship between world citizenship and willingness to fight for one’s country in war. Since national pride is considered to be the most important determinant of sacrifice for the nation, I start with a baseline model that only includes national pride and world citizenship. Subsequent models add a series of political and demographic control variables based on the findings of existing studies that examined individuals’ willingness to go to war for their country. Model 1 regresses willingness to go to war onto world citizenship and national pride. As shown in Table 3, the relationship between world citizenship and willingness to go to war is positive and highly statistically significant. World citizens are willing to kill and be killed in war for their country.

[Table 3. About Here]

The predicted probability of willingness to fight for country is 0.70 when cosmopolitan identification is at its highest and 0.65 when it is at its lowest.\(^{10}\) This shows that the likelihood of willingness to go to war increases by 5 percentage points as world citizenship moves from its lowest to the highest. In accord with the findings of existing research, national pride has a large

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\(^9\) If we focus on national pride, we observe similar results. Cosmopolitans not only identify with their nation but they are also proud of it. Among those who see strongly identify as cosmopolitan, an overwhelming majority, 74 percent, express being very proud of their nation. Similarly, 53 percent of those who moderately identify as cosmopolitan express very strong national pride.

\(^{10}\) In the calculation of predicted probabilities, all other variables are kept at their means or specified values.
and statistically significant positive effect on respondents’ willingness to fight for their country. When national pride is at its lowest, the predicted probability of willingness to go to war is 0.40, it increases to 0.73 when national pride is at its maximum. Figure 3 compares the predicted probabilities as cosmopolitan identity and national pride variables move from their minimum to their maximum. As can be seen, willingness to fight for country among those who express the highest national pride and highest commitment to world citizenship is roughly identical (the difference is only 0.3 percentage points).

[Figure 3 About Here]

Model 2 adds the variables confidence in the armed forces, support for democracy, and emancipative values to the analysis. As can be seen in the second column of Table 2, the effect world citizenship on willingness to go to war for the nation remains robust. World citizenship continues to exert a highly statistically significant effect on individuals’ war readiness. The predicted probability of war readiness is 0.70 when cosmopolitan identity is at its maximum. It declines to about 0.64 when cosmopolitan identification is at its minimum.

Replicating the results of existing studies, confidence in the armed is positively and emancipative values are negatively related to willingness to go to war. Support for democracy as a system of governance and national pride both increases one’s willingness to go to war.

Model 3 adds the demographic variables of education, income, gender, and age to the analysis. Higher income people and women are less willing to go to war. In contrast, higher education and younger individuals and are more willing. While national pride and confidence in the military have the largest substantive effects on willingness to fight, cosmopolitan identification continues to be an important determinant of war readiness. The predicted probability of war
readiness rises from 0.65 to 0.70 as cosmopolitan identification increases from its minimum to its maximum. As can be seen, the size of the coefficient for cosmopolitan identity hardly changes across the three model estimations. This shows that the positive effect of cosmopolitan identity on individuals’ willingness to fight is stable and not an artifact of a particular model specification. Cosmopolitans are patriots.

**Conclusion**

A long-time observer of the cosmopolitanism-nationalism debate Kai Nelson (1999: 446) argues that one can have “one’s cake and eat it too;” one can be a nationalist and a cosmopolitan. My results support this conclusion. A large number of cosmopolitans today are also nationalists. They see themselves as world citizens and as members of their nation, and they are ready to sacrifice for the nation. This means that even if there is a tension between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, “actually existing cosmopolitans” creatively handle the identity conflict between cosmopolitan and national identities and develop a dual identity.11

The most important implication of the results presented here is that the incompatibility claimed by some macro theories does not translate into an identity conflict at the individual level. At the level of global mass publics, individuals psychologically manage the trade-off between cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and patriotism; they have their cake and eat it too. More than ever before in human history are people connected in global networks and affected by shared global problems. More than ever since the rise of nation-states are people defining themselves as

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11 The term is borrowed from Bruce Robbins (1998)
cosmopolitan world citizens. Yet embracing the world clearly does not lead cosmopolitans to shed their national identity. The persistent attachment to national roots helps explains why nationalist movements are on the rise around the world despite the growing emphasis on cosmopolitan education and institutions.

The findings of this study are good news for liberal nationalists. Since world citizens do not relinquish their national identity and patriotic duties, liberal principles of justice, equality, and independence are not in jeopardy. Whether the results are good or bad news for the cosmopolitan ideal is partly an empirical question. Future studies should investigate whether cosmopolitans actually “practice global citizenship” and care about global redistribution, transnational advocacy, and cultural diversity (Cabrera, 2010). If world citizenship is a “multifaceted role attractive to individuals with varied outlooks on life” (Bayram, 2015), it is possible that certain kinds of cosmopolitans are virtuous world citizens and others are not. Scholars should carry out in-depth interviews and ethnographic analyses to unearth the different understandings of world citizenship and cosmopolitan behavior real people might hold.

As Sambanis and Shayo (2013, p. 320) note, “the dark side of a strong national identity might...be a greater predisposition to conflict with other nations. Although researchers continue to debate whether cosmopolitanism necessitates humanitarian military intervention (Brown and Bohm, 2017), few will deny that cosmopolitanism goes hand in hand with peace. Scholars should investigate whether cosmopolitan nationalism also has a dark side and explore the relationship among cosmopolitanism, different types of nationalism (such as liberal and conservative), and international conflict.

Another promising direction of research will be exploring how different subjective
understandings of the nation associate with cosmopolitanism. It is possible that pluralistic views on the nation are positively related to cosmopolitanism whereas essentialist ethno-nationalist conceptions conflict with world citizenship. Similarly, future studies can conduct direct tests of the identity switching argument developed here and examine the conditions under which cosmopolitans switch from world citizenship to nationalism. Since my theoretical argument is at the individual level, and I have no predictions about countries, a multi-level model is neither necessary nor suitable. However, scholars who are interested in developing country and individual-level hypotheses about cosmopolitanism and nationalism will be well-served by multi-level analyses.

An empirically grounded research agenda on cosmopolitanism is already underway. Political scientists have already began exploring the effect of cosmopolitan identity on political preferences (Bayram, 2017b; Reysen and Katzarska-Miller 2013). By advancing our understanding of how contemporary cosmopolitans manage their world citizen and national identities, this study contributes to this burgeoning literature.
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